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REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION:
SEEKING A BALANCE IN GANG PROSECUTION
H. MITCHELL CALDWELL*
Gang violence is a severe problem across the United States. Spreading from their inner-city
origins to surrounding suburbs, violent street gangs have proven all but impervious to legislative
attempts to curb their growing influence. This Article examines the presence of gangs, as well as
one of the landmark efforts to combat them, the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
(“STEP”) Act. The Article explores the potential abuse of anti-gang legislation by prosecutors,
such as overfiling and coercive plea-bargaining. Lastly, the Article offers solutions to curb such
abuse, including a statewide prosecutorial review board, full discovery from time of initial filing,
and a restriction on joining gang-related charges to other charges.
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INTRODUCTION
On a sunny afternoon in Los Angeles, a backyard barbeque at the Salinas residence was
disrupted when several members of the rival Hernandez street gang entered the backyard and
initiated a fight. During the fight, Ramon Hernandez, an active member of the Hernandez street
gang, suffered a serious, nonfatal stab wound. The remaining Hernandez gang members fled prior
to the police arrival. Ezequiel Salinas, a younger Salinas brother with no known gang
involvement, was arrested along with his older brother Jesse, a known active member of the
Salinas street gang. Both Ezequiel and Jesse Salinas were charged with assault with a deadly
weapon1 and a gang enhancement.2
Despite no direct proof that Ezequiel was a member of the Salinas gang or that Ezequiel
inflicted the knife wound, the prosecutor was confident that his “gang expert” would be able to
link Ezequiel to the gang. Moreover, the expert would be allowed to testify that the Salinas gang
engaged in a “pattern of criminal gang activity” due to the gang enhancement charge. 3 The
expert’s testimony could span a decade, detail violent events, and involve people Ezequiel had
never heard of or known. The prosecutor, well aware that such evidence most likely would link
Ezequiel by association to the Salinas gang and overwhelm the jurors’ ability to focus on the
nuances of the fight that led to the stabbing, could file the charges with impunity even though the
incriminating evidence was weak at best. Legitimate questions concerning Ezequiel’s noninvolvement could easily be lost. Was Ezequiel merely present at the scene of the crime? Was he
an aider and abettor? A co-conspirator? Or was he acting solely in self-defense? These types of
nuanced questions can easily be ignored when overwhelmingly negative and frightening evidence
is presented.
Beyond the consequences of the gang sentence enhancement if the case were to proceed
to trial, there is the potential for coercive plea-bargaining before trial.4 The potential punishment
for assault could go from a two-year prison term to an additional two-, three-, four-, five-, or tenyear prison term following a sentence enhancement charge. 5 One can easily imagine the
conundrum inside Ezequiel’s mind. Should he defend his innocence by going to trial and risk
being sentenced up to twelve years in prison? Or should he take a plea deal and eat two years?
In considering this scenario, several thoughts most likely come to mind. First, we may
consider that Ezequiel is at the blunt end of a very raw deal. Yet, we recognize the incalculable

1

CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (West 2015).

2

Id. § 186.22(b).

Id. § 186.22(e); see, e.g., Erin R. Yoshino, Note, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons
From Interviews with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 135-36 (2008) (“[T]he gang expert will often
choose the most heinous and violent crimes to illustrate the gang’s pattern of criminal activity.”).
3

4
See Brian Gregory, Comment, Brady Is the Problem: Wrongful Convictions and the Case for “Open File”
Criminal Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 827 (2012) (“Taken together, Bagley, Bordenkircher, and Ruiz have created a
reality in which prosecutors are free to make threats of long prison sentences or even death to induce a guilty plea . . . .
These circumstances may lead even wholly innocent defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk of conviction at
trial.”).
5

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2015).
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cost in human misery and economic waste that the horrific legacy of gangs has caused.6 Violent
gangs are a clear, present, and continuing danger, and significant measures are necessary to
counter them. This battle being waged on urban streets occurs in criminal courtrooms as
prosecutors attempt to deter criminal gang conduct. 7 Effectively prosecuting gang violence is an
admirable goal, but there are concerns that the efforts of some prosecutors come at the expense of
violating their higher calling and sworn ethical responsibilities. 8 Are the tools crafted by
legislatures across the country being employed improperly? Are prosecutors abusing gang-related
charges and enhancements in order to coerce pleas, a practice resulting in harsh sentences that are
unwarranted?
This Article examines legislative and prosecutorial efforts utilizing anti-gang legislation.
First, Part I explores the extent of the gang-related crime problems as well as the origins and
evolution of anti-gang legislation. Part II analyzes the successes and failures of anti-gang
legislation, focusing on the inherent constitutional challenges. Part III examines prosecutors’
ethical boundaries, and Part IV tackles the potential for prosecutorial abuse of anti-gang
legislation. Finally, Part V offers proposals designed to offset some of the abuses that have arisen
in gang prosecution.
I. GANGS AND ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION
Gangs, such as the Bloods, the Crips, Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13), and
18th Street now have a nation-wide presence.9 Not surprisingly, their presence has translated into
6
See David S. Rutkowski, Student Article, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging the
Moral Gap in Existing Law, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 137, 139 (1996) (“Gangs and gang crime pose an
extraordinary threat to society at large; in gang-controlled communities, they can exert almost ubiquitous authority.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks of
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Los Angeles Gangs Press Conference (Mar. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060331.html (“Mayors and U.S. Attorneys . . . know better
than anyone that gangs have become an increasingly deadly threat to the safety and security of our Nation’s citizens.”).
7

Jeffrey T. Wennar, Ganging up on Gangs: The Steps Necessary for Effectively Prosecuting Gang
Violence, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2010, at 3, 3 (“[Gangs] . . . . bring a culture of violence and drugs to our doorsteps,
creating an atmosphere of fear, diminishing the quality of life, and endangering the safety, well-being, and future of our
children.” (first alteration in original) (quoting MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS 1 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs27/27612/27612p.pdf)); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race,
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 109 (2000) (“Violent gangs are now having a major impact on the quality of life of
communities throughout the nation.” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
A COORDINATED APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGE OF GANG VIOLENCE: A PROGRESS REPORT 1 (1996))).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991) (claiming that in criminal
cases the “[c]odes of professional responsibility” treat prosecutors as “‘ministers’ having an ethical duty to ‘do justice.’”
(quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983))).
8

9

Combating Youth Violence: What Federal, State and Local Governments Are Doing to Deter Youth
Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t
Reform, 109th Cong. 9 (2006) [hereinafter Combating Youth Violence] (statement of Robert B. Loosle, Special Agent in
Charge, L.A. Criminal Div., FBI), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg45334/pdf/CHRG109hhrg45334.pdf.
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this country’s most significant crime problem. 10 Often heavily armed and with strong ties to the
illegal drug trade, gangs are “portrayed as an alien presence in otherwise stable communities.” 11
Gangs have been a part of American cityscape since the early nineteenth century. 12 Like
modern gangs, the earlier incarnations had a reputation for being territorial and engaging in
criminal activity.13 Fueled by the influx of immigrants from Italy, Ireland, China, and other
countries, these early gangs provided opportunities and their own sense of belonging to a group of
people whom society largely ignored.14 Gangs quickly spread, nearly unchecked by authorities,
who were convinced that gangs were only a threat in “certain types of neighborhoods.” 15
Predictably, these neighborhoods were low-income, with substantial immigrant and minority
populations.16
Pop culture has established gangs as a part of inner city life. 17 Gang movies, such as The
Wild Ones and Rebel Without a Cause glorified gang activities, as did the well-known 1957
Broadway musical, Westside Story.18 The musical, a revamp of the classic Romeo and Juliet story,
replaced the feuding Montague and Capulet families with the Jets and Sharks. 19 Despite the
show’s violent and tragic ending, one researcher characterized the show as creating the “image of
a group of kids whose members were aggressive and rebellious—but appealing.”20
Despite a momentary decline in gang activity in the late 1960s, 21 when authorities finally

NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., 2011 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT: EMERGING TRENDS 9
(2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011-nationalgang-threat-assessment-emerging-trends (“Gangs are responsible for an average of 48 percent of violent crime in most
jurisdictions and up to 90 percent in several others . . . .”); id. at 11 (“Neighborhood-based gangs continue to pose the
greatest threat in most jurisdictions nationwide.”).
10

11

Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 31 (1998)
(quoting Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of Youth Gangs, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 943, 945 (1993)).
12

David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street
Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 692 (1995).
13

Id. at 692 & n.45.

14

Id.

Id. at 692-93; id. at 693 n.47 (“As gang research progressed, however, gangs were discovered in
neighborhoods that were stable, though poor, where the same ethnic group had lived for an extended period of time.”); id.
at 693 n.49 (“Researchers generally have not found gangs, or have not looked for them, in places other than slums.”).
15

16

Id. at 693.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 693 n.50.

19

Id.

20

Joan Moore, Gangs, Drugs, and Violence, in GANGS: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY
YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES 27, 28 (Scott Cummings & Daniel J. Monti eds., 1993).
21

See HERBERT C. COVEY ET AL., JUVENILE GANGS 100 (1992). Several explanations have been suggested
for the temporary decline of gang activity in the 1960s. See id. at 100-01. One is that increased drug use among gang
members caused the decline. Id. at 101. Another argument is that traditional gang activity decreased as gang involvement
increased in the politics of the 1960s. Id. at 100-01. Many of the same people previously active in gangs were instead
participating in the political and civil strife of the 1960s. Id. at 100-01.
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began to combat gang violence, gang presence had spread to nearly every major city in the United
States.22 A 2011 study estimated that there are about 1.4 million members in 33,000 active street
gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs in the United States. 23 This marked “a 40 percent
increase from an estimated 1 million gang members in 2009.”24 Arizona, California, and Illinois
have the highest number of gang members, but officials believe that the Northeast and Southeast
regions increased the most in gang membership from 2009 to 2011. 25 In 2011, gangs were
believed to be responsible for nearly half of violent crimes in some cities, and up to ninety percent
in several others.26 The National Gang Intelligence Center’s 2013 Report indicated that gang
numbers have continued to increase since that time. 27 In a nationwide survey of law enforcement
personnel the same year, fifty-three percent of respondents indicated that gang membership had
increased in their jurisdiction since 2011.28
Los Angeles is the epicenter for gang activity in the United States. 29 The rise of gang
activity in California was dramatic in the 1980s.30 In 1981, an article in Time estimated that there
were approximately 350 gangs comprised of 20,000 to 30,000 members in the Los Angeles area
alone.31 Today, recent studies indicate that over 1,000 active street gangs exist in the Los Angeles
area, with as many as 175,000 members in the seven major counties of Los Angeles, San Luis
Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Orange. 32
It should come as no surprise, then, that the crime rate associated with gang activity has
shown a similar increase. One scholar notes that “[f]rom 1981 to 2001, there were approximately
10,000 gang homicides in the state of California, approximately seventy-five percent of which
22
Matthew Hardwick Blumenstein, Note, RICO Overreach: How the Federal Government’s Escalating
Offensive Against Gangs Has Run Afoul of the Constitution, 62 VAND. L. REV. 211, 212 (2009) (“There are gangs in every
state and in the District of Columbia.” (citing MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT STREET GANGS IN SUBURBAN AREAS 4 (2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs27/27612/27612p.pdf)).
23

NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., supra note 10, at 9.

24

Id. at 11.

25

Id. at 11-12.

26

Id. at 9.

See NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., 2013 NATIONAL GANG REPORT 9 (2013), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gang-report-2013/view (“Survey respondents indicate gang
membership and gang-related crime in the United States continue to increase steadily.”). In January of 2013, the number
of individuals murdered in Chicago surpassed the number of American troops killed in Afghanistan within the same time
frame. Id. at 10. Experts attribute the rise in Chicago’s murder rate to fractionalized gangs battling for turf control. Id.
27

28

Id. at 9. Additionally, fifty-eight percent of respondents indicated that gang criminal activity increased
either slightly or significantly since 2011. Id.
29
Combating Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 9; see also Gangs, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/content_basic_view/1396 (last visited June 18, 2015).
30

Yoshino, supra note 3, at 117.

Truman, supra note 12, at 694 n.57 (“A 1981 article in Time reported roughly 350 gangs with a total of
20,000-30,000 members in Los Angeles.”) (citing Jane O’Reilly & Benjamin W. Cate, Combat at Hollywood and Vine,
TIME, Aug. 24, 1981, at 27).
31

32

VIOLENCE PREVENTION COAL. OF GREATER L.A., FACT SHEET: GANG VIOLENCE (2007), available at
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/sciprc/pdf/GANG_VIOLENCE.pdf (citing Combating Youth Violence, supra note 9, at 9).
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occurred in Los Angeles County.”33 The California Department of Justice reports that “[f]rom
1998 to 2007, the number of gang related homicides increased by 16.1 percent.” 34 Other estimates
suggest that violent gang crime in Los Angeles County claims an average of one life per day, 35
and costs California taxpayers more than two billion dollars annually.36
Law enforcement officials across the nation have attempted to find effective solutions to
the gang problem.37 In California, various methods have been explored, but the consistent growth
in gang numbers belies any claims of success. 38 In response, “local and national law enforcement
agencies have sharpened their focus on combating gangs.” 39 The Los Angeles police “renewed
‘crackdowns’ on gang activity and . . . increased ‘gang sweeps’ of neighborhoods where they
believe[d] gang activity [was] high.”40
A. California’s STEP Act
These methods were met with little success, as California earned the dubious title of
“street gang capital of the United States.” 41 Even though the need for more assertive action was
clear as early as the 1980s, it wasn’t until September 24, 1988, that California signed into law its
first anti-gang bill, known as the Street Terrorism and Enforcement Act, or the “STEP Act.” 42
Declaring California in a “state of crisis” as a result of the activities of “violent street gangs
whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes,” the STEP Act contained
two key sections.43 The first created a substantive crime for active participation in “any criminal
street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct

33

Yoshino, supra note 3, at 117-18 (footnote omitted) (citing George Tita & Allan Abrahamse, Gang
Homicide in LA, 1981-2001, AT THE LOC. LEVEL: PERSP. ON VIOLENCE PREVENTION, Feb. 2004, at 1, 2).
34
EDWARD G. BROWN JR., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA 21 (2008), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/homicide/hm07/preface.pdf.

Introduction to Gangs, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/top_ten_most
_wanted_gang_members/content_basic_view/23466 (last visited June 18, 2015) (“In Los Angeles County [the] violent
acts [of gangs] claim an average of one life a day.”).
35

36

ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, CITYWIDE GANG ACTIVITY REDUCTION STRATEGY: PHASE III REPORT 5
(2007), available at http://advancementprojectca.org/sites/default/files/imce/p3_report.pdf.
37
See Blumenstein, supra note 22; Christopher S. Yoo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining
Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 212, 213 (1994).
38

Yoo, supra note 37, at 214-15.

Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s STEP Act, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 679 (2009).
39

40

Id.

Truman, supra note 12, at 686. As recently as 2007, former “Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa
asked the federal government for an additional thirty-million dollars to aid in [another gang] crackdown, . . . [as then-]
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared the state of California [prepared] to ‘declare a war on gangs.’” Van Hofwegen,
supra note 39, at 680.
41

42

Truman, supra note 12, at 707.

43

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2015); id. §§ 186.22(a)-(b).
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by members of that gang.”44 The second imposed harsher punishments for crimes “committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang.” 45 Although
initially drafted with a sunset clause that would have repealed the STEP Act in 1992, the Act has
been extended indefinitely.46
The California legislature was initially careful to limit the scope of the STEP Act,
making prosecutions under the new law “very difficult to prove except in the most egregious
cases,”47 and taking careful note of the potential for infringement on the First Amendment
freedom of association.48 The language of the original STEP Act limited prosecution to gang
members who commit crimes with (1) knowledge of the prior commission of (2) two or more
serious felonies by members of their gang. 49 And while the Act’s text only requires knowledge for
the substantive participation offense, a report from California’s Senate Judiciary Committee
indicated the importance of that knowledge to the Act’s drafters. 50 Moreover, the original
statutorily enumerated offenses were limited to seven felonies: “assault with a deadly
weapon . . . ; robbery; homicide or manslaughter; sale, manufacture, and possession for sale of
narcotics; shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied vehicle; arson; and witness and victim
intimidation.”51 Under these guidelines, only those people with knowledge of two “serious”
offenses committed by their gang’s members faced prosecution under the STEP Act. 52

44

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a).

45

Id. § 186.22(b).

46

California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 1988 Cal Legis. Serv. 1242 (West)
(codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-186.34 (West 2015)) (providing for automatic repeal by 1992); Act
of Oct. 3, 2013, 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 508 (West) (extending STEP Act to 2017, with possibility for further
extension).
47
Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of California’s AntiGang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 114 (2006) (quoting CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS:
AB 2013, Record No. 29069, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., at 4 (1988) (on file with the Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law)).
48

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2015).

49

Baker, supra note 47, at 114.

50

By reference to “more severe” punishment of gang crimes:

[The sponsors of AB 2013] considered [the initial seven enumerated offenses] to be extremely
serious crimes; in addition, they claim that these crimes are crimes which are typical of street gangs.
Once a prosecutor established that any member of a gang had committed at least two of these
crimes, the threshold for a pattern of criminal activity would be met. Any crime committed by a
member in addition to this threshold would be punished more severely [under the provisions of the
STEP Act].
Id. at 114-15 (alterations in original) (quoting CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: AB 2013, Record No.
29069, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., at 4 (1988) (on file with the Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law)); see also id. at 103 n.10 (“The
reason for the urgency [was] to provide the tools necessary for law enforcement to stem the tide of illegal gang warfare
without infringing upon the constitutional rights of any individual, at the earliest possible time.” (alteration in original)
(quoting CAL. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: AB 2013, Record No. 29069, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., at 4
(1988) (on file with the Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law))).
51

Baker, supra note 47, at 114.

52

Id. at 115.
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B. Legislation Across the Country
Following California’s lead, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have codified
some form of anti-gang measures.53 Of the fifty states, thirty-one now have laws that enhance
penalties for gang-related criminal acts, while twenty-eight states have passed gang-prevention
laws.54 Some states, such as Louisiana, Georgia, and Missouri, have enacted legislation that are
nearly carbon copies of California’s STEP Act, while others—like Florida, South Dakota, and
Illinois—have moved in new directions.55
In 1990, Florida passed its own STEP Act, which moved beyond the California Act by
defining the term “youth and street gang member,” 56 and offering a broader definition for the term
“pattern of youth and street gang activity.” 57 Under Florida’s STEP Act, “a person could meet the
statutory definition of a gang member simply by living in [an area frequented by a gang and its
participants], associating with [the gang’s members], and being stopped in the company of gang
members more than four times.”58 While the creation of a definition for the term “youth and street
53
See Highlights of Gang-Related Legislation, NAT’L GANG CENTER, http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/
Legislation/Highlights (last updated Aug. 2014).
54

Id.

55

Truman, supra note 12, at 710-11.

56

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(2) (West 1990). Florida law originally defined “youth and street gang

member” as:
[A] person who engages in a pattern of youth and street gang activity and meets two or more of the
following criteria:
(a) Admits to gang membership.
(b) Is a youth under the age of 21 years who is identified as a gang member by a parent or
guardian.
(c) Is identified as a gang member by a documented reliable informant.
(d) Resides in or frequents a particular gang’s area and adopts their style of dress, their use of
hand signs, or their tattoos, and associates with known gang members.
(e) Is identified as a gang member by an informant of previously untested reliability and such
identification is corroborated by independent information.
(f) Has been arrested more than once in the company of identified gang members for offenses
which are consistent with usual gang activity.
(g) Is identified as a gang member by physical evidence such as photographs or other
documentation.
(h) Has been stopped in the company of known gang members four or more times.
Id. This definition has now been replaced by “criminal gang member” and the criteria have been modified and expanded.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West 2015).
57
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West 1990). Rather than listing possible predicate offenses, Florida’s
STEP Act originally defined a “[p]attern of youth and street gang activity” as “the commission, attempted commission, or
solicitation . . . of two or more felony or violent misdemeanor offenses on separate occasions within a 3-year period, for
the purpose of furthering gang activity.” Id. This definition has been removed from the most recent version of Florida’s
STEP Act. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03 (West 2015).
58

Truman, supra note 12, at 717. Currently, Florida’s anti-gang measures fail to assign time-related

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss4/3

REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

7/24/2015 12:42 PM

REELING IN GANG PROSECUTION

349

gang member” would seem to offer firmer constitutional constraints than California’s STEP Act,
the term actually left Florida’s Act susceptible to challenges on freedom of association grounds. 59
The Florida Act did not establish a substantive gang-participation crime, but it did enhance
sentences for gang-related felonies, similar to the sentence enhancements of California’s STEP
Act.60
South Dakota’s anti-gang statute, passed not long after, models Florida’s. Although its
definition of a “street gang member” omits Florida’s provision whereby a parent or guardian can
identify an individual as a gang member,61 the bill is susceptible to the same freedom of
association challenges as Florida’s anti-gang laws.62
Illinois’s Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act (“STOP Act”) faces similar
potential constitutional challenges for its definition of “gang member,” which includes “any
person who . . . voluntarily associates himself with a course or pattern of gang-related criminal
activity.”63 Under this definition, a person who associates with gang members without actively
participating in the gang itself could nevertheless face severe sentence enhancements. 64 Unlike
other states, however, Illinois’s STOP Act created a civil cause of action in favor of any public
authority affected by gang activity. 65 It additionally employed its own definitions for the terms
“gang,”66 “course or pattern of criminal activity,” 67 and “gang-related” crime.68

boundaries to the qualification of being observed in the company of gang members more than four times, noting only that
“[o]bservation in a custodial setting requires a willful association. It is the intent of the Legislature to allow this criterion to
be used to identify gang members who recruit and organize in jails, prisons, and other detention settings.” FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 874.03(2)(j) (West 2015).
See Truman, supra note 12, at 717. The modern term, “criminal gang member,” is still just as susceptible.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03(3) (West 2015).
59

60

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.04 (West 2015); see also Baker, supra note 47, at 114-15.

61

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.03 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-10A-1 (2014).

62

Truman, supra note 12, at 717-18.

63

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/10 (West 2015). Gang members include:

[A]ny person who actually and in fact belongs to a gang, and any person who knowingly acts in the
capacity of an agent for or accessory to, or is legally accountable for, or voluntarily associates
himself with a course or pattern of gang-related criminal activity, or who knowingly performs, aids,
or abets any such activity.
Id.
64

Active participation is not a required element stated under the Illinois STOP Act. See Truman, supra note

12, at 717.
65
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (2015) (creating a civil cause of action in favor of public
authorities that have incurred costs due to criminal activity).

Id. at 147/10 (defining “street gang” or “gang” as “any combination, confederation, alliance, network,
conspiracy, understanding, or other similar conjoining . . . of 3 or more persons with an established hierarchy that, through
its membership or through the agency of any member engages in a course or pattern of criminal activity”).
66

Id. (defining a “[c]ourse or pattern of criminal activity” as “2 or more gang-related criminal offenses,” at
least one of which is a felony, “committed within 5 years of each other”).
67

68

Id. Gang-related crimes include those committed:
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Other states, like Indiana, offer different definitions for key terms, 69 and several states,
like Arkansas, use entirely different approaches to codifying anti-gang measures by basing their
legislation on the federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) statute. 70 Unlike the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (or the “RICO Act,” which serves as the basis for antigang legislation such as California’s), 71 the CCE focuses on organizations that deal with drug
trafficking and similar offenses. 72 Rather than focusing on participation in criminal gangs,
Arkansas’ bill focuses on enhanced punishments for criminal gang activity and the real property
used by criminal gangs, organizations, or enterprises. 73 Neither Indiana’s nor Arkansas’ efforts
have been declared unconstitutional yet. 74 Indiana, in particular, has seen constitutional challenges
specific to freedom of association interests, but since the state legislature amended the statute’s
language in 1994,75 it has been upheld as constitutional against all challenges. 76

(1) with the intent to increase the gang’s size, membership, prestige, dominance, or control in any
geographical area; or
(2) with the intent to provide the gang with any advantage in, or any control . . . over any criminal
market sector, . . . ; or
(3) with the intent to exact revenge or retribution for the gang or any member of the gang;
(4) with the intent to obstruct justice, or intimidate or eliminate any witness against the gang or any
member of the gang; or
(5) with the intent to otherwise directly or indirectly cause any benefit, aggrandizement, gain, profit
or other advantage whatsoever to or for the gang, its reputation, influence, or membership.
Id.
69
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-1 (West 2015) (defining “criminal gang” as “a group with at least
three . . . members that specifically: (1) either: (A) promotes, sponsors, or assists in; or (B) participates in; or (2) requires
as a condition of membership or continued membership; the commission of a felony or an act that would be a felony if
committed by an adult or the offense of battery.” (citation omitted)).
70

Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-104 (West 2015) with 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012). See also Truman,
supra note 12, at 712 n.151 (noting that “Arkansas’ Criminal Gang, Organization or Enterprise Act is modeled on the
federal Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute”).
71

Truman, supra note 12, at 712 n.151.

72

21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012); KENNETH CARLSON & PETER FINN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
(1993).

OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PROSECUTING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES 1

73
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-104 (West 2015) (enhancing felony classifications); id. § 5-74-109 (declaring as
a common nuisance “[a]ny premises, building, or place used to facilitate the commission of a continuing series of
three . . . or more criminal violations”).
74
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 969 S.W.2d 618, 620-21 (Ark. 1998) (upholding Arkansas’ statute against
vagueness challenge because the law “conveys fair and sufficient warning when measured by common understanding.”).
75

Act of Mar. 15, 1994, 1994 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 140-1994 (West) (amending IND. CODE ANN. § 35-459-1 (West1991)) (replacing the word “and” at the end of clause (1) with “or”).
76
See, e.g., Klein v. State, 698 N.E.2d 296, 299-300 (Ind. 1998) (rejecting a freedom of association
challenge and ruling that “neither the U.S. nor the Indiana Constitution protects associations made in furtherance of crimes
or criminal conspiracies”).
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C. Expanding Anti-Gang Efforts
Amidst shifting precedents and amending legislation, California’s STEP Act has
increased exponentially in scope since its inception. 77 Beginning in 1996, the California Supreme
Court suggested, in People v. Gardeley, that the second predicate offense may be charged
contemporaneously with a count of active participation in a criminal street gang. 78 This ruling
appeared to violate the legislature’s original intent to put potential STEP Act violators on notice
of liability, because in effect, it reduced the qualitative crime requirement to a single incident.
Four years later in 2000, the California electorate, through Proposition 21, expanded the list of
enumerated crimes listed in the STEP Act.79, Additions by the legislature also increased the
number of offenses.80 Today, the original list of seven now encompasses thirty-three offenses,
including the comparatively minor crimes of felony vandalism and automobile burglary. 81 A
subsequent appellate decision expanded the STEP Act’s scope even further, first by confirming
that the predicate offenses do not have to be gang-related,82 and then ruling that people who
commit those predicate acts do not even have to be gang members at the time of commission. 83
Despite these efforts to expand the scope of the STEP Act, gang activity continues to rise in
California, and the County and City of Los Angeles continue to be recognized as the “gang
capital” of the United States.84
Given the enormity of gang violence, there was a need for legislation designed to cope
with the problem. The rub, of course, is tailoring the remedy to meet the challenge, while not
violating the constitutional rights of those who fall within its purview or abusing the vast
discretion allotted to police and prosecutors. Nonetheless, given the very nature of the legislation,
it is clear that constitutional challenges will continue to be mounted.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
“The Constitution does not permit a legislature to ‘set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.’”85
Without question, the process of codifying anti-gang measures will continue to face
77

See Baker, supra note 47, at 115.

78

See People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 725-26 (Cal. 1996) (identifying one episode of assault by gang
members as “sufficient to establish not only the commission by gang members of assault with a deadly weapon, but also
the attempted commission by gang members of murder”).
79

See Baker, supra note 47, at 115.

80

Id.

81

See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2015).

82

People v. Augborne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting holding of Gardeley, 927

P.2d at 723).
83

Id. at 263-64.

84

See Truman, supra note 12, at 686 & n.13.

85

City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221

(1876)).
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challenges on several constitutional fronts, including concerns regarding freedom of association,
vagueness, overbreadth, and due process. The problem with examining those issues separately is
that constitutional challenges naturally bleed together; a statute that is vague or overbroad
frequently will infringe First Amendment association rights, violate due process protections, or
result in a combination thereof. This section will attempt to break those issues down, while
recognizing their natural overlap.
The First Amendment declares: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right
of the people to peaceably assemble.”86 Throughout history, various groups have successfully
extended this First Amendment right, and have engaged in political, social, legal, economic,
religious, and cultural activities without infringement by the government. 87 But what of criminal
street gangs? On one level this inquiry is basic, because they are criminal and thus not involved in
any “safe” or legal group dynamic. On another level, however, should citizens be denied their
constitutional rights to freely assemble merely because of the classification of the group of people
with whom they choose to associate? Ultimately, though, courts have long acknowledged that
criminal street gangs are not owed First Amendment protection, as “the act of associating with
compatriots in crime is not a protected associational right.” 88 The battle therefore is not over the
protection of criminal street gangs, but rather who is included in the definition of the “gang” for
purposes of prosecution. Further, the legislative challenge is not so much in identifying gangs,
although that is a factor, but rather in determining which individuals are to be caught up in the
gang dragnet.
A. Freedom of Association: Gang Participation and Vagueness
The United States Supreme Court first faced this issue in the 1950s, as the Cold War
raged, and the country was immersed in the Red Scare.89 Scales v. United States challenged the
constitutionality of the Smith Act, which was passed by Congress in 1940 in the hope of
combating the influence of the Communist Party of the United States (“CPUSA”). 90 The
defendant, Junius Scales, the leader of the North Carolina branch of the CPUSA, was arrested
under the Smith Act, which criminalized the actions of any person who “becomes or is a member
of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons” 91 or “who teach[es],
advocate[s], or encourage[s] the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or
violence.”92 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan recognized that the First Amendment
prevents any state from criminalizing mere association with any group, absent affirmative conduct

86

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

Alexander A. Molina, California’s Anti-Gang Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act: One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 22 SW. U. L. REV. 457, 463 (1993).
87

88

Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ind. App. 1993).

89

See generally Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) (affirming conviction for contempt where
witness refused to identify individuals as Communists); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding
conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act against First Amendment challenge).
90

Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).

91

18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2012).

92

Id.; Scales, 367 U.S. at 244.
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by the individual,93 but added that “[w]e can discern no reason why membership, when it
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this . . . forbidden advocacy,
should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of [the First] Amendment.” 94
The Court upheld the Act, concluding that it allowed punishment only where there is clear proof
that a defendant “specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to
violence.”95 Inherent in this requirement was specific knowledge by the prosecuted individual of
the organization’s illegal advocacy, which the Court later noted “was intimately connected with
the construction limiting membership to ‘active’ members.”96 This limitation, the Court ruled,
“does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with ‘the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.’” 97
Three years later, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Court was asked to evaluate
another law limiting the CPUSA. Aptheker focused on the constitutionality of a section of the
Subversive Activities Control Act, which made it unlawful for any member of a registered
Communist organization to apply for, use, or attempt to use a U.S. passport. 98 Recognizing that
“freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and
association,”99 the Court drew a clear distinction between the Smith Act’s limiting language, and
the much broader scope of the Subversive Activities Control Act.
Where the Smith Act’s punishment required active participation, the Court in Aptheker
noted that the Subversive Activities Control Act “renders irrelevant” a person’s degree of
participation in an organization and “his commitment to its purpose.”100 Most important, the Court
emphasized the Smith Act’s requirement of specific knowledge, which it considered “intimately
connected with the construction limiting membership to ‘active’ members.” 101 It cannot be
assumed that all “members” of a group participate in its illegal activities simply based on their
association.102 Moreover, the Court noted that the idea that a person could regain the ability to
travel with a U.S. passport by renouncing his or her Communist affiliations in “good faith” was
not enough to mitigate the limiting effects of the legislation, because it intrinsically curtailed an
individual’s right to associate freely. 103 This failure to distinguish between active participants and

93
Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25 (explaining that “[m]embership, without more, in an organization engaged in
illegal advocacy” is not “sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt”).
94

Id. at 229. Justice Harlan noted that there is a general protection for association under the First
Amendment, but that protection does not extend to criminal associations. See id.
95

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).

96

Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511 n.9 (1964).

97

Scales, 367 U.S. at 229 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).

Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 501-02; 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1988) (declaring that “it shall be unlawful for any
member of [a Communist organization] . . . to make application for a passport, or . . . to use or attempt to use any such
passport”) (repealed 1993).
98

99

Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 517.

100

Id. at 510.

101

Id. at 511 n.9.

The Court cited Justice Murphy who opined that “men in adhering to a political party or other
organization notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles.” Id. at 510 (quoting
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136 (1943)).
102
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mere sympathizers constituted a violation of First Amendment freedoms.104
Several years later, the Court invalidated another provision 105 of the Subversive
Activities Control Act in United States v. Robel, ruling that it also failed to draw the distinction
between peripheral members and leadership figures. 106 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
majority, stated that the statute “casts its net across a broad range of associational activities” 107
and “quite literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an
individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government in proscribing it.” 108
Echoed throughout a number of opinions analyzing organizations and the First
Amendment was the caveat that “[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms.”109 Since the 1950s, this caution has not changed,
and has not been limited to cases involving political organizations. 110
Perhaps recognizing the landscape shaped by the Supreme Court, the California
legislature attempted to craft the STEP Act to punish gang members only when they actively,
knowingly, and willfully participate in a gang’s criminal activity. 111 Because of this limiting
language, California’s courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the STEP Act
against freedom of association claims.112 However, in People v. Castenada, the California
Supreme Court was confronted with a gang conviction without a showing of actual gang
membership.113 Castenada was charged with criminal gang participation based on the fact that his
alleged armed robbery took place in known gang territory, and because Castenada himself had
been seen in the company of gang members several times previously. 114 Reasoning that to be
103
Id. at 507 (“Since freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment, restrictions
imposed upon the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting that the right to travel could be fully exercised if the
individual would first yield up his membership in a given association.”) (footnote omitted).
104

See generally id. at 510-14 (finding the statute insufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny).

105

50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1988) (repealed 1993) (making it unlawful for a member of a Communist
organization “to engage in any employment in any defense facility”).
106

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).

107

Id. at 265-66.

Id. at 265; see also id. at 262 (“It is precisely because the statute sweeps indiscriminately across all types
of association with Communist-action groups, without regard to the quality and degree of membership, that it runs afoul of
the First Amendment.”).
108

109
Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (noting that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved.”). See generally supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
110

See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39-40 (2010) (upholding a statute criminalizing
participation in a foreign terrorist organization because the law targeted active members with precision).
111

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a)-(e) (West 2015).

See, e.g., People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 284-85 (Cal. 2000) (explaining that the STEP Act “imposes
criminal liability not for lawful association, but only when a defendant ‘actively participates’ in a criminal street gang”).
112

113

Id. at 285.

See id. at 280 (“Seven times between August 1994 and October 16, 1995, the date of the crimes here,
Santa Ana police officers saw defendant in the presence of known Goldenwest gang members; on three of these occasions
they gave him written notice that Goldenwest was a criminal street gang. At those times, defendant bragged to the officers
114
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convicted of gang participation, a defendant must actively participate both with knowledge and
with the aim of furthering the gang’s criminal conduct, 115 the California court lowered the
threshold for active participation to only encompass “involvement with a criminal street gang that
is more than nominal or passive.” 116 The challenge then for the California courts was to further
define not only the requisite active participation, but the other two key terms of “knowingly” and
“willfully.” Such inquiries lead directly to questions of vagueness and overbreadth.
Is California’s STEP Act so vague that people “of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”? 117 Given that statutory language must clearly
define each element of criminal behavior and foreclose any discretionary interpretation by
prosecutors or judges, it follows that vague statutes can have a profound effect upon freedom of
association, as people may choose not to exercise this First Amendment protection, rather than
risk violating a statute they cannot understand or interpret.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in City of Chicago v. Morales,118 provided some clarity with
which to gauge California’s STEP Act. The Court examined a municipal ordinance in Chicago
that levied fines and possible prison sentences on individuals found loitering—provided police
officers believed the individual to be a gang member. 119 Noting that “the city cannot conceivably
have meant to criminalize each instance a citizen stands in public with a gang member,” 120 the
Court ruled the entire statute to be unconstitutionally vague “not in the sense that it requires a
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather
that he ‘kicked back’ with Goldenwest members and ‘backed them up,’ but he denied having been initiated into the gang.”
(alteration in original)).
115

Id. at 282-83.

116

Id. at 281. A California appellate court had previously interpreted the active participation requirement as
requiring a showing of that the defendant “devote[d] all, or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the criminal street
gang.” People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) abrogated by Castenada, 3 P.3d 278.
117

Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

118

City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).

119

Id. at 47. At that time, the Chicago Municipal Code stated:

(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal street
gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such
persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey
such an order is in violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no person who was
observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this section:
(1) ‘Loiter’ means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose
(2) ‘Criminal street gang’ means any ongoing organization, association in fact or group of
three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its substantial activities
the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal
activity.
Id. at 46 n.2 (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120

Morales, 527 U.S. at 57.
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in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”121 By failing to offer even minimal
guidelines for appropriate enforcement, 122 the statute did not provide those crucial standards
“sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.” 123
Conversely, California’s STEP Act, according to California’s highest court, does not
suffer from a similar lack of specificity. The California court concluded that by using the “plainly
worded requirements” of criminal knowledge, willful promotion, and active participation, 124 the
statute made it “reasonably clear what conduct is prohibited.”125 By contrast, Chicago’s ordinance
left the door open to broad interpretation as to the precise conduct that was deemed criminal.
In answer to vagueness concerns, as well as freedom of association concerns, the most
common approach in anti-gang legislation has been for legislatures to require active participation
in the gang as well as knowledge of the criminal activity by the gang. 126 Mere association with
gang members without knowledge of the gang’s criminal activity is insufficient as vague.127
B. Overbreadth Problems: Defining Gang Membership
The concept of overbreadth is not unlike that of vagueness: “[a] statute is considered to
be overbroad if in addition to the undesirable behavior, it includes constitutionally protected
activities, especially those related to free expression or free association.” 128
Beyond those issues dealing with “gang participation” is the equally nettlesome issue of
who is a gang member. It is of no help that California’s STEP Act does not define the term “gang
member.”129 Despite the conclusion of the California appellate court, in People v. Green, that the
word “member” is a term of “ordinary meaning, and require[s] no further definition,” 130 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the term “known to be a member” was unconstitutionally
121

Id. at 60 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 455 (1905) (“The power to determine the meaning of a statute
carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations as well as the method by which they shall be determined.”).
122

123

Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).

124

People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 285 (Cal. 2000).

125

Id.

126

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-4 (West 2015); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-45-9-3 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.2 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.423 (West 2015); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.168 (West 2014).
In the author’s experience, courts, legislators, and scholars occasionally confuse the terms “vague” and
“overbroad.” For a concise formulation of the overbreadth doctrine, see People v. Rokicki, 718 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999) (defining a statute as overbroad if it “(1) criminalizes a substantial amount of protected behavior, relative to the
law’s plainly legitimate sweep, and (2) is not susceptible to a limiting construction that avoids constitutional problems.”).
See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (rejecting overbreadth challenge and delineating substantial
overbreadth approach). For an example of a Supreme Court opinion invalidating a statute for vagueness, see Morales, 527
U.S. at 50-51 (holding that the city ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed enforcement against loiters
engaged in entirely “innocent” activities).
127

128

Bjerregaard, supra note 11, at 35.

129

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2015).

130

People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) abrogated by People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d

278 (Cal. 2000).
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vague nearly half a century earlier in Lanzetta v. New Jersey.131
Lanzetta and two others were brought before the Court, accused of violating a New
Jersey statute that read, in pertinent part: “Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation,
known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at
least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime . . . is
declared to be a gangster.”132 Faced with five to ten years of hard labor following their conviction
as “gangsters,” the defendants appealed, arguing that the language of the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.133 Noting that “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes,” 134 the Lanzetta Court found that the
term “gang” and the phrase “known to be a member” were “so vague, indefinite and uncertain” as
to constitute a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 135 In its decision, the Court cited a
well-known rule from Connally v. General Construction Co., requiring that the average person
must be made aware of potential criminal liability. 136 A solution which would eliminate the
constitutional challenges related to vagueness and overbreadth is for legislators to simply omit
associative words like “member” and “membership” altogether from anti-gang legislation.
Although “member” and “membership” have at times been deemed “terms of ordinary
meaning,”137 their definitions only relate to the word’s textual use, and leave the application of the
word ambiguous. Specifically, in regards to the word “member,” who decides whether someone is
a “member”? Using our earlier example, what if Ezequiel does not consider himself to be a
member of the Salinas gang, but the leader of the Salinas gang does? 138 Conversely, what if
Ezequiel believes himself to be a member of the gang, but the leader has not yet accepted him into
the gang? At what point would Ezequiel be considered a member of the Salinas gang? And at
whose discretion?139 As discussed earlier, California’s STEP Act allows punishment for “[a]ny
person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes,
131

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939).

132

Id. at 452.

133

Id.

134

Id. at 453.

135

Id. at 458.

Id. at 453 (“[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926))).
136

137

People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) abrogated by People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d

278 (Cal. 2000).
138

See supra Introduction.

See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 621-22 (Cal. 1997) (“Law enforcement officials admit
that there are many different levels of [gang] membership. . . . Thus, to simply identify a person as a ‘gang member’
conveys little about that person’s true level of involvement or activity.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Susan L.
Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 739, 750 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
139
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furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.” 140 Thus, to punish
a person for conducting criminal gang activity, California must determine and prove who the
other members of the gang are, and that they either currently engage “or have engaged in a pattern
of criminal gang activity.”141 Simply omitting the membership requirement from the Act would
eliminate any misunderstanding or confusion that arises from the complications associated with
determining the membership status in a criminal street gang. California’s STEP Act, as it
currently reads, permits an innocent person to be accused and convicted as a gang member, while
a guilty “gangbanger” may roam free because of a prosecution’s potential failure to prove the
gangbanger’s membership status. To avoid this inconsistency, the statute could be worded as
follows: Any person who actively and knowingly participates in any criminal gang activity (as
defined under California Penal Code § 186.22(e)), and who willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists another in committing any felonious criminal gang activity shall be punished . . . . This
simply-worded requirement would allow prosecutors to focus on prosecuting actual criminal gang
activity without expending valuable time and resources determining who is or is not considered a
“member” of a gang.
Unfortunately, rather than eliminating the problem by striking the membership
requirement, California’s counties have spent a considerable amount of judicial time and
resources attempting to address the membership question. The problem is that nearly all counties
have addressed it differently. For example, a person may be arrested as a gang member in
Stanislaus County for meeting two or more out of eight possible criteria—including past arrests
on suspicion of offenses consistent with usual gang activity and identification by an informant as
a gang member.142
In San Diego, however, there are nine total criteria to qualify as a gang member; a person
must meet at least three upon a single contact with police, or one or more across successive
contacts.143 California defense attorney Martin Baker points out that “a person who has . . . been

140

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2015).

141

Id.

142

All eight criteria are as follows:

1. Admit to being a gang member.
2. Have been arrested on suspicion of offenses consistent with usual gang activity.
3. Have been identified as a gang member by an informant.
4. Have been seen affiliating with documented gang members.
5. Have been seen displaying gang symbols [or] hand signs.
6. Have been seen wearing gang dress or having gang paraphernalia.
7. Have gang tattoos.
8. [Have been] seen frequenting gang areas.
Baker, supra note 47, at 110.
143

San Diego’s criteria are as follows:

1. Subject has admitted to being a gang member.
2. Subject has been arrested alone or with known gang members for offenses consistent with usual
gang activity.
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contacted by police [three times] while visiting [a family member or friend] in a ‘gang area’
[could be arrested] as a gang member in San Diego, but not in Stanislaus County.” 144 In order to
know with certainty, a person must research the gang criteria in any given county—a warning that
is even posted on a Los Angeles Police Department website detailing gang member criteria in Los
Angeles.145 As it stands, therefore, an individual must guess—at peril to his liberty and property—
as to whether he qualifies as a gang member in his jurisdiction.
One common method states use “to mitigate challenges of overbreadth is to explicitly
exclude constitutionally protected activity from the scope of the statute.” 146 For example, antigang legislation in Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana recognize “‘the
right of every citizen to harbor and constitutionally express beliefs on any lawful subject
whatsoever, to associate lawfully with others who share similar beliefs, to petition lawfully
constituted authority for a redress of perceived grievances, and to participate in the electoral
process,’ and that ‘it is not the intent of this subchapter to interfere with the constitutional exercise
of the protected rights and freedoms of expression and association.’” 147 The rub with the above
statement is the unnecessary use of the word “lawfully.” Does not the First Amendment protect
the right of every citizen to constitutionally express his or her beliefs on any subject, regardless of
the lawfulness of the subject?148 And what about the right to associate?149 And the right to petition
for redress of grievances?150 By inserting the words “lawful” and “lawfully,” the legislation
enables the prosecutor to potentially restrict and define which types of constitutionally protected
rights are “lawful.” To correct the legislation’s attempt to limit its citizens’ constitutional rights,
the words “lawful” and “lawfully” should be removed from their current locations in the statute.
In order to recapture the legislators’ likely intent, the statute could read, in pertinent part, “the
3. Subject has been identified as a gang member by a reliable informant [or] source.
4. Subject has been identified as a gang member by an untested informant.
5. Subject has been seen affiliating with documented gang members.
6. Subject has been seen displaying symbols [or] hand signs.
7. Subject has been seen frequenting gang areas.
8. Subject has been seen wearing gang dress.
9. Subject is known to have gang tattoos.
Id. at 111.
144

Id.

How
Are
Gangs
Identified,
L.A.
POLICE
DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/
get_informed/content_basic_view/23468 (noting that individuals looking for information about the identification of gang
members outside the city of Los Angeles must “check with [their] local law enforcement agency for current information”)
(last visited June 18, 2015).
145

146

Bjerregaard, supra note 11, at 38.

147

Id. at 38-39; (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-102(a) (2014)); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21
(West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 874.02(1) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-2(a) (West 2015); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 147/5(a) (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1402(A) (2014).
148

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

149

Id.

150

Id.
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right of every law-abiding citizen”—thus still prohibiting any unlawful conduct (as defined by
state statute), but also respecting the constitutional rights granted to each citizen by our country’s
founders.
As one commentator sagely stated, “in many instances, legislatures attempt to address
overbreadth a priori by explicitly indicating a compelling state interest and maintaining that the
statutes do not infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.” 151 Often, these mitigating efforts
attempt to protect legislation against both vagueness and overbreadth challenges. 152
“As with vague laws, statutes that are overbroad may deter citizens from practicing their
First Amendment rights and may grant law enforcement officials too much discretion, leading to
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” 153 As a result, anti-gang legislation must meet a
heightened standard by including statutorily limiting constructions in an effort to protect
constitutional freedoms.154 Requiring active participation along with knowledge of the group’s
criminal activities and imposing a specific intent requirement narrows the potential reach of the
statute.
Furthermore, the right to associate to advance one’s beliefs and viewpoints is undeniably
considered an aspect of “liberty” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.155 Not only does the First Amendment explicitly assure the right, but the “First
Amendment . . . freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any State.” 156
III. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTORS
“The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not . . . be discouraged.”157
Justice Sutherland, writing for the United State Supreme Court, once described the
prosecutor as a “servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”158
Justice Douglas warned that “[t]he function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not
to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of
people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial.” 159
In that dual role, a prosecutor must properly evaluate the weight of the evidence against a

151

Bjerregaard, supra note 11, at 39.

Id. (noting that “methods utilized by legislatures to avoid vagueness challenges also help to mitigate
overbreadth challenges”).
152

153

Id. at 35-36.

154

See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).

155

Molina, supra note 87, at 462.

156

Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 107-08 (1981).

157

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995).

158

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

159

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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particular defendant,160 file only appropriate charges,161 not engage in coercive plea
negotiations,162 comply with all discovery obligations,163 and, should the matter go to trial,
conduct herself not just as the defendant’s adversary, but also as the “guardian of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.”164 She must not allow pressure from victims, supervisors, or the community
to unfairly influence her prosecutorial decisions, 165 because, while a prosecutor has the right—and
even the obligation—to “strike hard blows, [she] is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
[a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” 166
The problem is that there are relatively few safeguards to protect against prosecutorial
misconduct. Judicial opinions refer only to the abstract idea of a prosecutor’s role, without the
specificity needed to constitute guidance. 167 The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) are similarly vague, and place the dubious responsibility
of reporting attorney misconduct on all lawyers: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.” 168
Noting the lack of guidance, the Model Rules adopted several general guidelines

160

See Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2976 (2010).

See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (“A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best
judgment . . . in deciding which suits to bring . . . .”); see also Prosecutorial Discretion, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM.
PROC. 209, 220 (2007) (“[T]he Due Process Clause prohibits a prosecutor from bringing a more serious charge against a
defendant who has pursued a statutory right of appeal from a conviction on a lesser charge for the same offense.”) (citing
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974)); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform
of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 240 (2006) (“[P]rosecutors
should only charge a defendant with those offenses that adequately describe the defendant’s conduct, based on conduct
that is not socially innocuous.”).
161

See Langer, supra note 161, at 237 (stating that a prosecutor should not bring or threaten charges “where
admissible evidence does not exist to support the charges” or where she “has no good faith intention of pursuing” them
(quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.1(h) (3d ed. 1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
162

163

See FED R. CRIM. P. 16(a).

164

People v. Sherrick, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 27 (Cal Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v. Trevino, 704 P.2d
719, 725 (Cal. 1985)); see United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to
win, but to win fairly, staying well within the rules.”).
165
See Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1323 (“While lawyers representing private parties may—indeed, must—do
everything ethically permissible to advance their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the government in criminal cases
serve truth and justice first.”).
166

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

167

See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1362-63 (2011) (listing rules governing prosecutors
behavior without explanation); see also Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 431 n.156 (2011) (characterizing the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice as a response to the dearth of guidance in state ethical codes).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2008). The comment accompanying Rule 8.3 further
clarifies that “[t]he term ‘substantial’ refers to the seriousness of the possible offense.” Id. at cmt. 3.
168
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regarding “the postures lawyers should take in a variety of situations,” 169 but the only distinction
drawn between attorneys in general and prosecutors in particular was that “[t]he responsibility of
a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely
to convict.”170 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for Criminal Justice also
developed a model set of standards for prosecutors, but those guidelines suffered from the same
lack of specificity.171 Neither offer concrete rules of conduct, nor do they outline specific
consequences for errant behavior.
When prosecutors do not adhere to the rules, the criminal “justice” system ceases to mete
out justice.172 In 1999, two reporters at the Chicago Tribune explored the actions of prosecutors in
the wake of Brady v. Maryland,173 the seminal case requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
evidence.174 The reporters opened a five-part series with a scathing critique: “With impunity,
prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths and the law, committing the worst kinds
of deception in the most serious of cases.” 175 Sadly, the article’s bitter truth is exemplified by the
actions of former Judge Ken Anderson who, while still a Texas prosecutor, withheld exonerating
evidence which led to the wrongful conviction of an innocent man. 176 In an all-too-rare
occurrence,177 Anderson was sentenced to ten days in jail.178
By its nature, the criminal justice system places tremendous discretion in the hands of

169
Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm
of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 224 n.2 (1993).
170

KATHLEEN RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A
REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997-2009, 44 (2010) (quoting ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The only guidelines offered by the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice are invectives “to guard the
rights of the accused and those of society.” See id. at 90 n.97; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2 cmt. (3d. ed. 1993) (“[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to
protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the
public.”).
171

172
See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 10, 1999),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-01-10/news/9901100269_1_retrials-and-appeals-conviction-prosecutors (“Since a
1963 U.S. Supreme Court ruling designed to curb misconduct by prosecutors, at least 381 defendants nationally have had a
homicide conviction thrown out because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence they
knew to be false. Of all the ways that prosecutors can cheat, those two are considered the worst by the courts. And that
number represents only a fraction of how often such cheating occurs.”).
173

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

174

Id. at 87; see Armstrong, supra note 172.

175

Armstrong, supra note 172.

176

Associated Press, Ex-Prosecutor in Texas is Punished for a Wrongful Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/us/ex-prosecutor-is-punished-for-a-wrongful-conviction.html.
177
See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 172 (noting that not a single prosecutor was convicted of a crime
despite the finding of 381 wrongful homicide convictions between the years of 1963 and 1999 and a declaration by the
U.S. Supreme Court that “such [Brady] misconduct by prosecutors [is] so reprehensible that it warrants criminal charges
and disbarment”).
178

Chuck Lindell, Ken Anderson to Serve 10 Days in Jail, STATESMAN (Nov. 8, 2013, 5:02 PM),
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/ken-anderson-to-serve-10-days-in-jail/nbmsH/.
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prosecutors. Prosecutors are the only actors entitled to all of the evidence generated by law
enforcement and, absent a court order, they choose when and what information to release.
Prosecutors hold the exclusive power, acting under the umbrella of the executive branch, to
“determine whom to charge with public offenses and what charges to bring.” 179 And, because of
the separation of powers, a prosecutor’s discretion in charging is generally “not subject to
supervision by the judicial branch.” 180 When used appropriately, this discretion allows for those
prosecutors most familiar with the cases to make the initial charging decision in light of “the
complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law
enforcement.”181 Problems arise, however, when prosecutors abuse this discretion.
IV. THE POTENTIAL ABUSE OF ANTI-GANG LEGISLATION
Anti-gang legislation, with its array of potential charges and enhancements, is an area
ripe for the abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Such abuse is most often generated by filing charges
and enhancements unwarranted or disproportionate to the conduct of the accused. 182 Overfiling
can result in a number of abuses. First, it can (and often does) lead to coercive plea-bargaining.183
Second, inclusion of any gang-related charges allows for the introduction of otherwise
impermissible and highly prejudicial testimony. 184 Finally, should an accused opt for trial and
suffer a conviction, the sentence could well reflect the enhanced charges. Each of these concerns
is addressed below.

179

Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 13 (Cal. 2002) (quoting People v. Birks, 960 P.2d 1073, 1089

180

Id.

(1998)).

181

Id. (quoting People v. Keenan 758 P.2d 1081, 1098 (1988) (quoting People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776,
788 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182

See H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal,
63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 62 (2013) (“Charging a greater offense than the defendant’s conduct warrants, or adding an
enhancement of little merit, gives an unfair advantage to the prosecutor.”).
Id. at 63 (“Overcharging to gain a competitive advantage in the give-and-take of plea bargaining is an
insidious abuse of the prosecutor’s power.”); see Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006) (“[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even
Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining
purposes. This often results in individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences than other individuals
who are less morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial.” (footnote omitted)).
183

184

See Mitchell Eisen et al., Probative or Prejudicial: Can Gang Evidence Trump Reasonable Doubt?, 62
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 4 (2014) (“It is fair to say that when the word ‘gang’ is used in Los Angeles County, one
does not have visions of the characters from the ‘Our Little Gang’ series. The word gang . . . connotes opprobrious
implications.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Perez, 170 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981))).
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A. Overfiling and Coercive Plea-Bargaining
Plea-bargaining is “an essential component of the administration of justice.”185 Plea- and
sentence-bargaining—conducted by prosecutors adhering to their ethical obligations—is critical
to the functioning of our criminal justice system. Indeed, without wholesale disposition of cases,
the system would fall in on itself.186 Plea- and sentence-bargaining dominate modern criminal
prosecution in the United States.187 However, as set forth at this Article’s outset, when the threat
of a lengthy sentence pressures an accused individual to plead to trumped-up offenses or to agree
to a sentence still disproportionate to his actual criminal conduct, the practice loses all value.
Overfiling sets the stage for coercive plea-bargaining by allowing prosecutors to begin
the bargaining process with their foot on the neck of the accused. 188 Reverting back to the
Ezequiel Salinas hypothetical, Ezequiel was charged with an underlying felony of assault with a
deadly weapon.189 And since the STEP Act allows a gang enhancement to the assault charge,
Ezequiel faces at minimum a two-year enhancement on any felony conviction. For serious
felonies190 and violent felonies, someone like Ezequiel faces a sentencing enhancement of five
years and ten years, respectively. 191
Ezequiel and his brother were both charged with assault with a deadly weapon with an
attached gang enhancement. According to the statute, if Ezequiel proceeds to trial he could face
four years or a $10,000 fine on the underlying felony. 192 If convicted on the underlying felony,
Ezequiel’s sentence could double—up to eight years—because of the gang enhancement.193
Instead of receiving an offer of less than a year in jail or even summary probation for simply
being involved in a fight, Ezequiel will likely receive an offer closer to three years in prison. 194
In this hypothetical scenario, the gang enhancement significantly changes his bargaining
position and potential exposure. Instead of a maximum four-year sentence—which in all
185

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see also H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea
Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 75 (2011).
186
See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (“[Plea-bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system.”).

See, e.g., Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (“In today’s criminal justice system . . . the negotiation of a plea
bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”).
187

188
See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 185, at 65 n.13 (“‘[V]ast prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage’
can impinge on a defendant’s free will to choose whether or not to plead guilty to the proposed charges.” (quoting Tracey
L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 866 (1995))).
189

See supra Introduction.

190

For a list of serious felonies, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West 2015).

191

See id. § 186.22(b)(1)(B); id. § 186.22(b)(1)(C).

192

Id. § 245(a)(1).

193

Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A).

See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 118 (stating that California Penal Code § 186.22(a) “creates a substantive
offense and provides for the punishment of up to three years for anyone ‘actively participat[ing]’ in a criminal street gang
as either a felony or misdemeanor” (alteration in the original)).
194
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likelihood would not be meted out at sentencing—Ezequiel, because of the enhanced charges,
must bargain from a far inferior position. Even if Ezequiel did not participate in the fight, the
potential sentence of twelve years could well lead a reasonable person to take a plea deal of three
years rather than run the risk of losing at trial and being sentenced to an additional ten years. A
defense attorney might even suggest that Ezequiel take the plea deal rather than go to trial, noting
that the prosecutor will most likely attempt to introduce evidence to prove up the gang
enhancement.195 The harmful effect of the gang evidence, even if only tenuously supported, could
well prejudice a jury into believing that Ezequiel was just another gangbanger like his brother. 196
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the introduction of such gang evidence could be enough to
result in a guilty verdict when its absence would otherwise lead to an acquittal.
At trial, a prosecutor might have a difficult time proving that a man without any gang
tattoos and no criminal record fits the build of a hardened criminal committing crimes to benefit
the Salinas gang. But, as discussed above, the gang enhancement can significantly impact the
bargaining position of an accused as early as filing. Although the prosecution must prove the gang
enhancement at a preliminary hearing, the applicable standard is probable cause—not beyond a
reasonable doubt.197 Because of the low standard at a preliminary hearing, the gang enhancement
could well survive the preliminary hearing198 or the grand jury hearing.199 A prosecutor working
the case may well realize that proving the gang enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt would be
difficult, but would recognize the benefit of attaching the enhancement to gain leverage in the
inevitable plea and sentence discussions.200
The problem is that even if the prosecutor is unable to prove to the jury that Ezequiel
195
See id. at 140 (“Because gang enhancements can add such a significant amount of time to one’s
sentence, defendants will often accept the certainty of the prosecutor’s plea bargain rather than gamble with not only
conviction and sentencing for the underlying crime, but also the possibility of adding an additional five years, ten years, or
life sentence to his term.”); id. at 138 (“Gang enhancements have caused a drastic change in the advice that an attorney
gives a client because they impose significantly higher sentences and the mere allegation is so highly prejudicial.”).
196

See infra Part IV.B (providing a detailed discussion of the prejudicial impact of gang testimony).

197

To establish probable cause, the prosecution must make some showing regarding the existence of each
element of the charged offense. Williams v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 987, 990 (Cal. 1969).
198
See Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposal for Defensive Summary Judgment
in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 676-77 (2011) (“The purpose of a preliminary hearing is for the trial court to
determine whether probable cause exists to bind a defendant over for trial. . . . The court may base its finding of probable
cause entirely on inadmissible evidence, including hearsay or unlawfully obtained evidence.” (citing FED. R. CRIM. P.
5.1(e) and FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3))).
199
See John P. Martin, Department: Practice Tips: Representing Clients Before Federal Grand Juries, 20
L.A. LAW. 16, 17 (1997) (stating that after hearing the evidence against the accused, the grand jury determines the
probability that a crime has been committed, and upon the grand jury’s “belief that there is sufficient information to hold
an accused to answer at trial” it will issue an indictment); see also, e.g., STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL
PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 177
(2007) (“[G]rand juries are rubber stamps. The notion that they protect defendants—any defendants—against prosecutorial
abuse is a fraud.”).
200

Yoshino, supra note 3, at 132-33, 137-38 (discussing various incentives a prosecutor might have for
filing a gang enhancement, including increasing the pressure on the defendant to plead, judges’ concerns for judicial
efficiency, using the defendant’s gang membership as evidence of his motive to commit the crime, political pressure,
permitting the admission of gang evidence against a defendant, and getting federal money to combat gang violence that is
granted to prosecutors who have a demonstrated gang problem).
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committed assault with a deadly weapon “for the benefit of” 201 his brother’s criminal street gang
“with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members,”202 the jury is arguably more likely to convict Ezequiel of the underlying felony
regardless of his actual involvement because of his association with his brother. Additionally,
should the case go to trial, Ezequiel may even be tried at the same time as his brother, further
associating him with a gang member. 203 Knowing this, Ezequiel’s defense counsel may suggest
that the best course of action is to take a plea deal rather than proceed to trial. 204 A defendant in
Ezequiel’s position will plead if “the value of the plea, less the costs associated with transacting
the plea bargain and serving the offered sentence, is worth more to the defendant than what he or
she might gain at trial.”205
Using anti-gang legislation to overfile charges and enhancements to benefit prosecutors
during plea and sentence negotiations constitutes raw abuse of prosecutorial powers, and can (and
frequently does) result in pleas and sentencing grossly disproportionate to the conduct of the
accused.206
B. Prejudicial Impact of Gang Testimony at Trial
The potentially prejudicial effect of gang testimony at trial is seen in Ezequiel’s journey
through the criminal justice system. As mentioned above, a prosecutor can attach a gang
allegation or enhancement, proceed past the preliminary hearing stage because of the low
probable cause standard, and introduce evidence of a defendant’s affiliation—however loose—
with a particular gang. Even if the jury is not convinced of the involvement of gang activity, the
introduction of gang evidence will almost certainly affect the jury’s view of the underlying felony
count, should the case proceed to trial.
In decades past, the word “gang” did not carry the sinister impact it now conveys. In
People v. Zammora, a case from the 1940s, a California appellate court concluded that the use of

201

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2015).

202

Id.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) (“The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are
alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction . . . .”); see also United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362, 371
(D. Colo. 1996) (ordering separate trials due to the “unacceptable risk” of violating the Confrontation Clause should
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols be tried jointly).
203

See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 139 (“The mere possibility of having a gang enhancement added at the
preliminary hearing may cause [a public defender] to advise his client to take the prosecution’s offer because: (1) the
addition of the gang enhancement increases the client’s sentencing exposure significantly; (2) the prejudicial nature of the
gang enhancement will often lead to the client’s conviction based on his alleged gang membership without proper
consideration of the facts; and (3) the client is left only with the defense that he was a minor gang member, or only an
associate, which is hardly a reliable defense on which to stake one’s liberty.”).
204

205

Caldwell, supra note 185, at 70.

206

It is interesting to note that § 1192.7 of the California Penal Code prohibits plea-bargaining for any
serious felony “unless[, among other reasons,] there is insufficient evidence to prove the people’s case.” CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1192.7(a)(2) (West 2015). However, under the notion that we are all innocent until proven guilty (beyond a
reasonable doubt), plea-bargaining a serious felony charge when the prosecutor does not have enough evidence to prove
guilt is essentially plea-bargaining an innocent individual, as he has not yet been proven guilty, and thus is presumed
innocent.
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the word “gang” carried no more weight than its literal meaning as a group of “the usual and
ordinary crowd of young people living in any particular neighborhood, who associate themselves
together, and from time immemorial has been referred to as a ‘gang.’” 207 The world has clearly
changed since the 1940s.
Just shy of four decades after hearing People v. Zammora, the California Supreme Court
reached a different conclusion about the meaning and impact of introducing gang evidence in
People v. Cardenas.208 In Cardenas, the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by
permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of common gang membership, because proof of
such affiliation had “limited probative value, [and] its admission created a substantial danger of
undue prejudice.”209 Two years later, in Williams v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
stated that “evidence of common gang membership . . . is arguably of limited probative value
while [also] creating a significant danger of unnecessary prejudice.”210 Additionally, the court
stated that “[t]he implication that gangs were involved and the allegation that petitioner is a gang
member might very well lead a jury to cumulate the evidence and conclude that petitioner must
have participated in some way in the murders”211 Thus, although the court in Cardenas and
Williams specifically addressed the admissibility of evidence of common gang membership, it
takes no stretch of logic to conclude that the reason the court suppressed the evidence was the
connotation of the word “gang,” and that even the mere use of the word could unduly prejudice a
jury against the defendant.212 As a California appellate court, in People v. Perez,213 stated “[i]t is
fair to say that when the word ‘gang’ is used in Los Angeles County, one does not have visions of
the characters from the ‘Our Little Gang’ series. The word gang . . . connotes opprobrious
implications.”214 Supporting this conclusion, a 2014 study of 212 participants in a simulated trial
found that “the introduction of testimony indicating any sort of association with a gang, even a

207

People v. Zammora, 152 P.2d 180, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). In Zammora, the Delgadillo family was
hosting a birthday party at their home, and had twenty or thirty invited guests in attendance. Id. at 184. After the party had
begun winding down, a group of uninvited guests, known only as the “boys from Downey,” joined in an altercation with
several of the younger Delgadillo guests down by a small pond located on the Delgadillo property. Id. As a result of the
fight, one victim was killed and two victims were severely injured. Id. at 185. The indictment charged twenty-two
defendants, each with murder and assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 184. The trial court found three of the defendants
guilty of first-degree murder and nine of the defendants guilty of second-degree murder. Id. Upon review, the California
appellate court remanded the case due to the lack of a fair trial received by the defendants. Id. at 216. One of the factors
considered during review was the prejudicial impact of the repeated use of the word “gang.” Id. at 204-05. Although
appellants contend that the frequented reference to their involvement in the “38th Street Gang” resulted in their prejudice,
the appellate court did not agree because “the term was not used in such a manner as to convey any opprobrious or sinister
implications.” Id. at 205. In coming to that resolve, the court reflected on the “ages of the members . . . coupled with the
nature and character of their association.” Id.
208

People v. Cardenas, 647 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1982).

209

Id. at 572.

210

Williams v. Superior Court, 683 P.2d 699, 705 (Cal. 1984).

211

Id. at 706.

See Rutkowski, supra note 6, at 148 (“Given the various statutory provisions, theories of prosecution,
and psychological ‘gang’ factors, it is important to label correctly particular actors and acts as gang involved.”).
212

213

People v. Perez, 170 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

214

Id. at 623.
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weak one, can have a significant prejudicial effect on jury verdicts.” 215
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kennedy v. Lockyer,216 reversed a trial
court and held that allowing “testimony regarding gang membership ‘creates a risk that the jury
will [probably] equate gang membership with the charged crimes’” 217 and that “the use of gang
membership evidence to imply ‘guilt by association’ is impermissible and prejudicial.”218 As a
result of the introduction of gang evidence’s prejudicial impact, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the matter. 219
V. STRIKING A BALANCE IN ANTI-GANG PROSECUTION
Legislatures across the country have given prosecutors powerful tools to combat the
scourge of gang violence.220 Such power wielded by overzealous prosecutors can wreak serious
damage on a system striving to strike a balance between public safety and individual liberty. 221
215

Eisen et al., supra note 184, at 8, 12.

216

Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2004). In Kennedy, the defendant, Robert Kennedy, was
tried twice for selling a substance in lieu of cocaine. Id. at 1042. During the first trial, the court granted defense counsel’s
motion to “exclude all references to any gangs and any gang affiliation,” unless allowed by the court. Id. at 1044. In
addition, the judge told the prosecutor that he would “have to be pretty convincing before [the judge would] let that
[evidence] come in.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting transcript) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first
trial judge’s reasoning behind prohibiting the gang references was that “the introduction of evidence tending to show gang
affiliation on the part of Kennedy would be highly prejudicial.” Id. at 1055. After the first trial resulted in a hung jury,
Kennedy twice requested a copy of the complete transcript from the state court, and was subsequently denied such a copy.
Id. at 1042-43. During the second trial the prosecutor (who happened to be the same prosecutor as was present in the first
trial) introduced gang-related evidence, and Kennedy’s newly acquired counsel, not being aware of the first trial judge’s
motion to exclude gang-related evidence, failed to object. Id. at 1043. The jury found Kennedy guilty, and because he had
“two prior serious or violent offenses, he was sentenced for the $20 sale of a non-drug to a prison term of twenty-five
years to life.” Id. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the case law “make[s] it clear that evidence
relating to gang involvement will almost always be prejudicial and will constitute reversible error. Evidence of gang
membership may not be introduced . . . to prove intent or culpability.” Id. at 1055.
217
Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d at 1056 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hankey, 203
F.3d 1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000)).
218

Id.

Id. at 1057-58. California’s state courts have largely followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead in this respect. As
recently as 2010, in People v. Memory, a California appellate court reversed defendant Memory’s conviction for voluntary
manslaughter following a trial that saw extensive testimony regarding the nature of the Jus Brothers Motorcycle Gang, of
which Memory was a member. People v. Memory, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 376-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). Noting that
“[g]ang evidence should not be admitted at trial where its sole relevance is to show a defendant’s criminal disposition or
bad character as a means of creating an inference the defendant committed the charged offense,” id. at 372 (quoting People
v. Sanchez, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)), the appellate court concluded
that allowing “expert” testimony connecting Jus Brothers with Hell’s Angels allowed “unreasonable inferences to be
made by the trier of fact that the [defendant] was guilty of the offense on the theory of ‘guilt by association.’” Id. at 373
(alteration in original) (quoting In re Wing Y., 136 Cal. Rptr. 390, 395-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
219

See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992) (“The power and
prestige of the American prosecutor have changed dramatically over the past twenty years. . . . [P]rosecutors wield vastly
more power than ever before.”).
220

221

See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite
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With that balance in mind and without suggesting wholesale change, there are aspects of the
criminal justice system that could be rethought to better achieve that sought-after balance. I offer
three proposals. The first seeks independent review of prosecutorial misconduct. Second, there
should be full and complete discovery from the time of initial filing continuing on an expedited
basis throughout pre-trial and into trial. And third, in joining crimes arising from completely
independent events where at least one of the alleged crimes involves gang involvement, the
burden should shift from the defense to the prosecution to establish a lack of prejudicial impact
due to the joinder.
A. Establish a Statewide Prosecutorial Review Board
“[W]hile [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones.”222
In making recommendations to improve the ethical prosecution of gang-related cases, we
must start with the simple admonition for prosecutors entrusted with these serious cases to follow
the ethical guidelines to which they are sworn. 223 Doing so would most likely obviate the need for
further recommendations. The unfortunate reality, however, is that in the often combative and
competitive world of criminal prosecution, there is so often the tendency to lose sight of the goals
of the system—namely, that justice be done. 224 And so, with a nod to reality, I propose a statewide
prosecutorial review board to investigate and, when appropriate, sanction prosecutor misconduct.
Prosecutors who abuse anti-gang legislation to obtain disproportionate pleas and
sentences or to gain tactical advantage should be directly sanctioned. 225 This is a bold proposition
but realistic and necessary.226 Currently, the occurrence of any form of direct sanction against an
errant prosecutor is so remote as to be freakish and, even then, only when circumstances are
egregious and the resulting hardship is unfair. 227 As discussed earlier, one such freakish event

sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. . . . It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.”).
222

Id.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008) (stating that prosecutors are “minister[s] of
justice”); see also Zacharias, supra note 8 (claiming that, in criminal cases, the “codes” treat prosecutors as “ministers
having an ethical duty to do justice”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223

224
See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that a prosecutor’s “interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”).
225

See Caldwell, supra note 182, at 89; see also Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A
Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 303, 316 (2010) (“The disciplining of lawyers who commit misconduct . . . provides an appropriate vehicle for
punishing prosecutors who violate Brady.”).
226

See generally Caldwell, supra note 182.

227

See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, CRIM. JUSTICE,
Spring 2008, at 24, 37 (noting a study’s finding that in most cases of misconduct “prosecutors suffered no consequences
and were not held accountable or even reprimanded for their behavior”); see also In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764 (Ariz. 2004)
(disbarring prosecutor for using false testimony from a jailhouse informant to obtain convictions and death sentences for
all three defendants in a triple-murder trial); Natasha Minsker, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45 CAL.
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occurred in 2013, when Texas judge Ken Anderson was sent to jail because of his actions while a
prosecutor.228 In prosecuting defendant Michael Morton, Anderson intentionally withheld
evidence; Morton was convicted, and subsequently served nearly twenty-five years in prison.229
Texas dusted off an underutilized “court of inquiry,” a procedure typically used to hold elected
officials accountable, and brought it to bear on Anderson. 230 Unfortunately, this rare instance of
calling out a prosecutor was only due to the significant publicity the case had generated.231
Nonetheless, Texas officials used the procedure to examine and sanction the former prosecutor’s
conduct.232
With the exception of this aberrational circumstance in Texas, no state has a mechanism
to effectively examine and sanction instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 233 One commentator
recently noted that “[n]o institution or entity has yet established a system to examine the large
percentage of wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct and to attempt to make
recommendations to deter such misconduct.”234
Curiously, while there are judicial misconduct boards in virtually all states to examine
allegations of judicial misconduct and mete out appropriate sanctions, no such mechanism exists
in any state to examine prosecutorial misconduct and impose appropriate sanctions. 235
Other than internal controls within each prosecuting office, prosecutors are virtually free
to go about their business with impunity. 236 For the most part, the only time any instance of
misconduct by a prosecutor comes to light is in appellate decisions. It is not unusual for appellate
courts to cite to instances of misconduct but uphold the conviction because the prosecutor’s

W. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (2009) (noting that, of six named prosecutors in California death penalty cases reversed for
prosecutorial misconduct, “[f]ive have ‘no public record of discipline,’ and one is a sitting judge”).
228

Supra notes 176 & 178.

229

See Scott Ehlers, State Criminal Justice Network Legislative Update: Lessons Learned from Legislative
Victories in the Lone Star State, CHAMPION, May 2014, at 47, 47 (2014) (“Exoneree [Michael Morton] . . . spent nearly a
quarter-century in prison until DNA evidence proved that he was innocent.”).
230

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01 (West 2015).

See Ehlers, supra note 229, at 48 (“The national Innocence Project requested the court of inquiry.
NACDL [National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers] Past Presidents Barry Scheck, Cynthia Orr, and Gerald
Goldstein played a critically important role in the court of inquiry that resulted in criminal charges being filed against
Anderson and his ultimate conviction for contempt of court.”) (footnotes omitted).
231

232

See generally In re Honorable Ken Anderson, No. 12-0420-K26 (26th Dist. Ct., Williamson Cnty., Tex.
Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/andersonfindings.pdf/view.
233
See Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson,
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 919 (2012) (“When [prosecutorial] misconduct is uncovered, few jurisdictions provide
adequate and consistent means of addressing it.”).
234
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C.
L. REV. 275, 285 (2004).

See Yaroshefsky, supra note 233, at 919 (“[P]rosecutors often escape censure for repeated disclosure
violations, even in their own workplaces.”).
235

236
See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-96 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from
liability for false statements in a probable cause hearing); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)
(holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for using false testimony at trial).
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misconduct was deemed “harmless error.”237 And, even in such instances, the prosecutor’s
misconduct results in no adverse consequences to the prosecutor. 238
Given such a lack of actual sanction and the protection of “harmless error” doctrine,
gang prosecutors are free to abuse anti-gang legislation. A meaningful step in preventing abuses
of anti-gang legislation would be to directly sanction abusive prosecutors.
B. Full Discovery from Time of Initial Filing and Throughout Pretrial and Trial
The criminal justice system is at its fairest and most effective when both the prosecution
and defense have full knowledge of the facts and probable evidence in the charged offense. 239
Brady v. Maryland offered this promise, but, through various judicial permutations, has fallen
short of that promise.240 Full disclosure from the filing of charges would render the inevitable plea
negotiation a more evenhanded affair. Defense counsel would be in a better position to fairly
evaluate the case and, should the case be over-charged, call out the prosecutor. Brady established
the precedent for prosecutorial conduct regarding the suppression of evidence by declaring, “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”241 Brady was extended by United States v. Agurs, in which
the Supreme Court required federal prosecutors to voluntarily provide exculpatory material to the
defense, regardless of whether the defense specifically requests the information or not.242 The
Court has held that evidence is material only if a reasonable probability exists that, “had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 243
The question of materiality is often speculative and, unfortunately, the decision whether to release
information is typically left in the hands of the prosecutor. 244
Brady does not go far enough, and several states have been bold enough to implement
policies designed to facilitate fuller discovery. Ohio, for example, recently revamped its criminal
discovery rules at the urging of the Ohio Innocence Project. 245 Ohio’s new rules now require
237

See, e.g., Hooks v. Oklahoma, 19 P.3d 294, 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), postconviction relief denied,
22 P.3d 231 (Okla. Crim. App.), aff’d in part sub nom. Hooks v. Workman, 606 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2010); Duckett v.
Oklahoma, 919 P.2d 7, 19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2002).
238

See cases cited supra note 237.

See Caldwell, supra note 182, at 54 (“The American criminal justice system is at its fairest when both
sides adhere to the rules.”).
239

240
See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011) (concluding that the Supreme Court does not
“assume that prosecutors will always make correct Brady decisions”); id. at 1367 (“Brady mistakes are inevitable.”) (J.
Scalia, concurring); see also Gregory, supra note 4, at 830 (“[T]he lack of meaningful enforcement of the Brady rule by
the courts, coupled with the near total absence of corresponding repercussions for prosecutors who violate Brady, renders
the rule itself moot.”).
241

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

242

See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976).

243

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).

See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (“In the typical case . . . it is the State that decides
which information must be disclosed.”).
244

245

Gregory, supra note 4, at 847-48.
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“disclosure of a large amount of material beyond that which is ‘favorable to the defendant and
material to guilt or punishment.’”246 In addition, Ohio’s reform requires that “double-blind”247
procedures take place when asking eyewitnesses to identify suspects. 248 Minnesota and North
Carolina have implemented an “open-file discovery” rule.249 Under open-file discovery, the
prosecution is required to disclose all non-privileged evidence and information related to the case,
whether in actual or constructive possession of the prosecution team, to the defense and to the
court.250 The disclosure must occur in a timely manner,251 continue throughout the course of the
trial,252 and full disclosure must be made 253 prior to the defendant entering a guilty plea. 254 The
benefit of an open-file discovery rule is twofold. First, it allows the defendant to be fully aware of
the State’s case against him. Common law jurisprudence holds each defendant innocent until
proven guilty,255 thus giving the “innocent” defendant every opportunity to defend his innocence
by being fully aware of the state’s case against him. Second, it removes the burden, and therefore
the responsibility, of the prosecutor to make decisions regarding what evidence or information
must be disclosed to the defense. 256 While the open-file discovery rule may not be an all246

Id. (quoting OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(B)(5)).

247

See Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
807, 862 (2007) (defining double blind procedures as those in which “the experimenter does not know which participants
are in the experimental and control groups”).
248

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2015).

Gurwitch, supra note 225, at 315 n.52. “Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire and
Oregon, require open file discovery in capital cases.” Id.
249

250

Id. at 315.

251

See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 33.11(a) (3d ed. 1993) (“A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest
feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.”); see also ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2008) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . . make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense . . . .”).
252
See United States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that Brady is not violated when
the Brady material is made available to the defendants before start of the trial); see also Jason B. Binimow, Annotation,
Constitutional Duty of Federal Prosecutor to Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. FED. 401, § 2a
(1999) (“[A] Brady violation can occur if the prosecution delays in transmitting evidence during trial . . . .”) (citing United
States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412 (11th Cir. 1991)).

See Binimow, supra note 252, § 2a (“[A]s long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the
defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence, due process is satisfied.”) (citing United States v. Allain, 671 F.2d
248 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996)).
253

See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecutor’s suppression of
material evidence favorable to an accused violates due process).
254

255
See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (“This Court has declared that one accused of a crime
is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on
grounds of an official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.”).
256
Although I suggest broad open-file discovery practices in order to help curb Brady violations, I still
acknowledge and agree that disclosure should not be made if such disclosure “could result in substantial harm to an
individual or to the public interest.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 3 (2008).
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encompassing solution to curbing some aspects of prosecutorial misconduct, it is a promising
start. Full disclosure from the earliest aspects of a case would assist with the problem of coercive
plea-bargaining. For instance, should a prosecutor attach a gang enhancement on less-thancompelling evidence, full discovery would allow defense counsel to more fairly and accurately
assess the evidence against her client and respond accordingly.
In summary, if our hypothetical Ezequiel decides to defend his innocence and fight the
charges, needless to say he will be in for an uphill battle. California does not practice “open-file
discovery,” and prosecutorial misconduct can be as easy as sweeping exculpatory evidence under
the rug. In order for Ezequiel to have a fighting chance and be given a fair trial, he has to hope
that his prosecuting attorney favors justice over winning. Justice Souter said it best that
“disclosure [of a favorable piece of evidence to the defense] will serve to justify trust in the
prosecutor as ‘the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’” 257
C. Shift the Burden to the State to Establish Lack of Undue Prejudice
When Joining Gang-Related Charges to Other Charges
Consider the following addendum to the Ezequiel hypothetical: Two years prior to the
Salinas-Hernandez fight, nineteen-year-old Ezequiel raped a seventeen-year-old. Although he was
not immediately apprehended, DNA evidence was gathered in the rape case. However, there was
no DNA evidence to match against that found at the scene, and consequently the rape case was
left unresolved. Following Ezequiel’s alleged participation in the Salinas-Hernandez fight,
Ezequiel’s DNA was taken and entered into the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) 258 and
he was linked to the rape.
The prosecutor then filed both crimes in one charging document with every intention of
trying the two completely unrelated cases in one trial before one jury. A clever prosecutor would
lead with the very strong DNA evidence in the rape case and follow with the more tentative
evidence in the assault case. The concern, of course, is that the evidence in the rape case will
surely prejudice the jurors against Ezequiel, which would most likely result in his conviction on
the assault charge. Although studies have shown that a defendant’s chances of conviction
increases by more than ten percent if he stands trial on more than one count, 259 there remains a
strong legislative preference for joinder.260 The rationale: “Trials are expensive, time consuming,
and burdensome on witnesses and victims.” 261 This legislative preference for joinder is also based
in part on the belief that joinder helps “avoid needless harassment of defendants and . . .
257

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (omissions in original) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
258
Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751, 760 (2011)
(“Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) [is] a central database into which participating states and agencies can ‘load’
the genetic profiles they lawfully acquire and search among the profiles made available by other jurisdictions.”).
259
Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and Severance on Federal Criminal
Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 VAND. L. REV. 347, 401 (2006).

See United States v. Pierce, 733 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Joinder is favored for reasons of
judicial economy.”); United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Joinder remains the rule rather than the
exception in criminal cases.”).
260
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Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 354.
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prevent[s] piecemeal enforcement of the law, thus saving the public the time and expense of
redundant trials.”262
While addressing the topic of joinder, the Second Circuit in United States v. Smith stated,
“Congress has authorized consolidation . . . [i.e. joinder] in the belief that public considerations of
economy and speed outweigh possible unfairness to the accused.” 263 There is, however, a fine line
between the benefits of joinder to society and the burden imposed on the defendant. As voiced by
the California Supreme Court, “the pursuit of judicial economy and efficiency may never be used
to deny a defendant his right to a fair trial.”264
The rub in every joinder scenario is that the more charges filed, the greater the prejudice
to the accused.265 It benefits the prosecutor to have more than one charge against an accused.266
One may recall the old adage, “Where there is smoke . . . .” Recognizing the goal of justice in
criminal cases, is it fair to stack the deck when there is a real concern of prejudice because of
joinder? Curiously, once a prosecutor makes the decision to file cases jointly it then remains for
the accused to carry the burden that prejudice will result from joinder. 267 Given the concerns of
prejudice, should the burden be on the accused to establish prejudice as a result of joinder or on
the prosecution to establish a lack of prejudice?
Joinder is considered to be proper and thus presumably non-prejudicial in one of three
settings: “First, joinder is allowed if the alleged crimes are based on the ‘same act or
transaction.’”268 For example, the charges against a defendant who assaults a store clerk while
robbing a grocery store can be joined. “Second, joinder is permitted if the alleged crimes are part
of a ‘common scheme or plan,’ such as when a middleman buys drugs from a supplier then sells
them to a distributor.”269 And third, “charges can be joined if they are of the ‘same or similar
character.’”270 A defendant who robs a gas station in December and then again in July may have
the two charges joined, “even if the two charges are distant in time and location and even if they
are not part of an overarching criminal plan.” 271
In determining the prejudicial impact of joinder, most courts conclude that non-crossadmissible charges272 should be severed if the inflammatory nature of one of the offenses, or of a

262
MICHAEL G. MILLMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 52.01 (2014) (citing Kellett
v. Superior Court, 409 P.2d 206, 209 (Cal. 1966)).
263

Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 112 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1940)).
264

Williams v. Superior Court, 683 P.2d 699, 706 (Cal. 1984).

Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 355 (“[T]he more counts in the indictment, the quicker the jury
may be to assume that the accused must be guilty of something.”).
265

266

See id. at 369 (“Joining additional charges increases the conviction rate . . . .”).

267

See 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 223, at 489 (4th ed.
West 2015) (“The burden is on the defendant to make a strong showing of prejudice to obtain the relief permitted by Rule
14.”).
268

Leipold & Abbasi, supra note 259, at 353.

269

Id.

270

Id.

271

Id.

272

To determine cross-admissibility of the evidence of each joined charge, one must determine whether
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distinctive common factor, could have a prejudicial effect on the jury in a joint trial, 273 or if
joinder of a strong case with a weak one, or of two weak cases, would create a likelihood that the
jury would impermissibly aggregate the evidence. 274 However, because of the policy favoring
joinder, the burden falls to the defense to establish undue prejudice due to joinder. 275 Given the
significant prejudicial concern involving gang-related charges the burden should shift to the state
to establish a lack of undue prejudice due to joinder of a gang-related case to any other charge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Efforts to protect those caught up in the criminal justice system are unpopular. The level
of crime and devastation generated by gang culture in the United States makes this especially true
for efforts to curb the growing influence of anti-gang legislation and the agents who enforce such
legislation, public prosecutors. Yet, it is not criminals who would be protected by the changes
suggested in this Article. It is not Jesse Salinas, a known member of a violent street gang, who
would benefit. Rather, it would be people like Ezequiel, whose only “crime” was being related to
his brother.
Implementation of the proposals set forth would strike a balance in gang prosecutions
such that only those gang participants meriting the harsh consequences of the legislation would
feel the appropriate wrath of the law.

“evidence on each of the joined charges would have been admissible . . . in separate trials on the others.” People v. Kraft, 5
P.3d 68, 99 (Cal. 2000). In addition, if the trial court finds the evidence is in fact cross-admissible, then “[s]uch crossadmissibility would ordinarily dispel any inference of prejudice.” Jacki Brown Evans, Issues of Severance, CrossAdmissibility and Sua Sponte Instructions in Sexual Offense Cases, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 112 (1991) (quoting People
v. Miller, 790 P.2d 1289, 1306 (1990)); see also United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2003); United
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 370 (3d Cir. 2001).
273

The concern with a disparity of evidence between two charges is that the jury could logically conclude
that because “[the defendant] did it before, he must have done it again.” United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th
Cir. 1985). On the other hand, the concern with inflaming the jury is that the jury might become so emotionally outraged
due to the defendant’s evidenced guilt for one crime, that they would punish him with a guilty charge for another crime as
well.
274
When a “weak” case is joined with a “strong” case or with another “weak” case, the spillover effect of
aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges, in essence making two
plus two equal five. As mentioned earlier, the concern is that the jury might logically, as opposed to emotionally, conclude
that because “[the defendant] did it before, he must have done it again.” Id.

See People v. Johnson 764 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Cal. 1988) (“[D]efendant can predicate [joinder] error only
on a clear showing of potential prejudice.”).
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